We investigate external and internal corporate governance activity observed at Japanese banks over 1985 -1996. External governance appears to be inactive, and even after the onset of the banking crisis of the 1990s there are few mergers, failures, and other changes in ownership and control. Prior to the banking crisis we do not find a relation between bank performance and executive turnover. In contrast, non-routine turnover of bank presidents is inversely related to both stock returns and profitability in the 1990s. Consequently, internal governance activity is observable following the onset of the Japanese banking crisis, a period otherwise characterized by inactive external governance and regulatory forbearance. D
Introduction
The banking sector plays a prominent role in the Japanese economy. For much of the post-war period, banks were the predominant source of external financing for Japanese firms and anchored a governance system characterized by relationships among firms belonging to keiretsu corporate groups (Aoki et al., 1994) . The Japanese financial system experienced significant changes in the 1980s and 1990s, however. Important changes in the operating environment of Japanese banks include a shift by large Japanese firms toward financial markets for external financing, globalization, the collapse of asset prices in the 1990s, deterioration of banks' financial health, a subsequent decade of meager growth, and a decline of the keiretsu system Kashyap, 1999, 2001 ).
The prominence of banks in the Japanese economy and the frequent linking of banksector health to the overall economy suggest that corporate governance of Japanese banks themselves is an important topic for research. However, in contrast to the many studies of the implications of Japanese-style corporate governance for non-financial firms, there are conspicuously few studies that investigate corporate governance of Japanese banks per se. Consequently, there is little evidence on the extent to which governance of Japanese banks contributed to, exacerbated, or responded to the banking crisis.
This study investigates governance activity at more than 100 Tokyo Stock Exchangelisted Japanese banks for the 12-year period 1985 -1996 . We divide the sample period into a pre-crisis period characterized by growth, profitability, and positive stock-price performance and a crisis period characterized by stagnation, poor profitability, and stock-price depreciation. For both periods we examine ownership structure, control activity, topexecutive turnover, and bank performance.
We first investigate external governance activity, broadly defined to include any material change in ownership or control. There are few failures and mergers among Japanese banks during our sample period, even after the onset of the banking crisis. Detailed examination also reveals rigidity in ownership and control. The marked absence of external governance activity suggests that governance of Japanese banks must be accomplished by internal mechanisms. We presume that bank performance is a reliable proxy for executive effectiveness and interpret executive turnover following poor stock returns or profitability and as evidence of active internal governance. We do not detect a relation between turnover and stock returns, profitability, or asset growth in the pre-crisis years of 1985-1990, however . This finding could reflect that absolute bank performance, especially when measured by stock prices, was high during the pre-crisis period, and that relative performance did not factor into evaluations of top executives. Perhaps bank managers were evaluated on other criteria during this period, such as non-public performance measures or the collective performance of firms in the banks' client networks. A less benign interpretation is that Japanese bank managers did not face performance incentives in the late 1980s when lending decisions exposed banks to risks that subsequently became manifest in the collapse of asset prices, the recessions, and the bad loan problems of the 1990s.
Incentives for Japanese bank executives appear to sharpen during the crisis period of 1991-1996. Specifically, we find an inverse relation between bank performance and nonroutine presidential turnover, i.e., when a president is replaced yet does not succeed to the chairmanship. For instance, the observed frequency of non-routine presidential turnover for a bank in the worst quintile of market-adjusted stock return is 7.0%, versus 1.6% for a bank in the best performance quintile. Similarly, the frequency of non-routine turnover for a bank in the worst quintile of industry-benchmarked profitability is 15.1% versus about 2.5% for other banks. Performance-turnover relations of this magnitude are commonly interpreted as economically significant and are comparable to those observed at U.S. banks and Japanese industrial firms (Barro and Barro, 1990; Kaplan, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995) . In short, our results suggests that Japanese bank executives faced consequences for poor performance in the 1990s, a period otherwise characterized by inactive external governance and regulatory forbearance.
Our investigation contributes to our knowledge of corporate governance in several ways. First, relative to our understanding of corporate governance of Japanese industrial firms we know very little about the governance of Japanese financial institutions, particularly with respect to the banking crisis of the 1990s. For example, several studies address whether Japanese banks face so-called ''market discipline'' and establish that bank performance and risk are reflected in stock prices even when financial statements are opaque and regulators follow policies that prop up poorly performing banks (Genay, 1998; Brewer et al., 1999; Yamori, 1999; Bremer and Pettway, 2002) . Our study is important because it suggests that internal mechanisms at Japanese banks provide performance incentives to executives in the 1990s, a period otherwise characterized by regulatory forbearance and inactive external governance. On the other hand, Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) indicate that deregulation, disintermediation, internationalization, deteriorating balance sheets, and other characteristics of the Japanese banking sector in the 1990s prompt a dire need for consolidation and restructuring. Jensen (1993) and Kaplan (1997) suggest, however, that internal governance mechanisms, in general, and performance -turnover relations of the economic magnitude we document, in particular, may not be sufficiently powerful to motivate restructuring in response to economic shocks. In light of our findings, the long delay in restructuring of the Japanese banking sector, along with its collateral effects on the Japanese economy as a whole, could be viewed as such a case.
Section 2 discusses how aspects of corporate governance may have played a role in the Japanese banking crisis and its aftermath. Section 3 presents evidence on ownership and control of Japanese banks. Section 4 describes data on top executive turnover. Section 5 investigates the relation between bank performance and managerial turnover. Section 6 discusses our results and concludes.
The Japanese banking crisis: origins and implications for governance activity
External shocks to an industry provide researchers intriguing opportunities to investigate the performance and adaptation of corporate governance systems (Kole and Lehn, 1997) . We treat the Japanese banking crisis of the early 1990s as such a shock, and we examine governance activity at Japanese banks both prior to and after the onset of the crisis. Before suggesting implications of the banking crisis for governance activity, it is first necessary to briefly discuss the origins of the crisis itself.
In response to changes in their operating environment in the 1980s, Japanese banks altered their lending practices and exposed themselves to risks that subsequently became manifest in the banking crisis of the 1990s. In particular, globalization of capital markets and liberalization of Japanese bond markets in the 1980s prompted many prominent corporations to borrow directly from the capital markets and bypass banks, formerly the primary suppliers of capital (Anderson and Makhija, 1999; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001) . Individual savers did not enjoy parallel liberalization that would promote widespread access to non-bank savings vehicles, and a complex web of regulations that restricted banks to segmented regions and product lines was not dismantled (Sibbitt, 1998; Hoshi and Kashyap, 1999) . Thus, Japanese banks faced an exodus of prominent borrowers, retained a captive deposit base, and were restricted to traditional markets for bank services. Confronted by this change in operating environment Japanese banks shifted their lending to risky borrowers and relied heavily on real-estate collateral as security (Hoshi and Kashyap, 1999) .
The shift in lending strategies proved disastrous when collateral values collapsed and recession ensued. Indeed, the Japanese banking crisis is often associated with the collapse of asset prices in the early 1990s. Fig. 1 shows the evolution of land prices and Japanese bank-stock prices from 1982 to 1997. Land and bank-stock prices more than tripled from the mid-1980s to their respective peaks in late 1989 and mid-1990. Land and bank-stock prices dropped precipitously thereafter to 40% and 30% of peak value, respectively, by the end of 1997. The drop in asset prices substantially decreased both the collateral values against which banks had made commercial loans and the value of equity positions held by banks, eroding their hidden capital reserves. The decline in asset prices, the ensuing recession, and poor performance by corporate borrowers are considered the proximate causes of the banking crisis.
Regulation is often posited as a primary mechanism for governance of financial institutions, but denial, regulatory forbearance, political gridlock, minimal policy response, and systemic moral hazard marked the years following the collapse of the ''bubble economy'' in Japan (Cargill et al., 2000) . The severity of the bad loan problem, estimated to be three to four times larger than the U.S. savings and loan crisis of the 1980s as a fraction of GDP (Hoshi and Kashyap, 1999) , was ignored or, at best, underestimated. Regulators coerced healthier banks to support weak banks and mask their problems, resulting in the so-called convoy system (Wall Street Journal, 1992) . Reforms were delayed as politicians, regulators, and bankers gambled on dramatic recovery of asset prices and the overall economy that did not materialize. Bank regulatory agencies appeared understaffed and inexperienced, and in some cases regulators even cooperated in concealment of non-performing assets or accepted bribes by providing advance notice of surprise inspections. In short, Prowse's (1997) characterization of regulatory scrutiny of banks as an inefficient substitute for other governance mechanisms seems especially true of Japan in the 1990s.
We investigate the extent to which non-regulatory government mechanisms are active for Japanese banks. First, observation of changes in ownership concentration, shifts in ownership and control, and an increase in bank mergers and failures would be consistent with external governance activity. Transfers of ownership and control are frequently characterized as an effective manner to redeploy assets in response to economic shocks, especially banking sector shocks (Jensen, 1993; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Berger et al., 1999) . We hypothesize that external governance mechanisms would respond to the Japanese banking crisis by reallocating ownership and control to efficient monitors and by motivating managers to restructure and make efficient capital allocation decisions.
In Japan, however, governance occurs largely via internal mechanisms because the market for corporate control is relatively inactive (Kaplan, 1997) . Internal mechanisms include board oversight of management and the threat of dismissal for ineffectiveness. No extant study examines the performance -turnover relation for Japanese banks, but prior research documents that poor performance increases the likelihood of managerial turnover at U.S. industrial firms (Warner et al., 1988) , U.S. banks (Barro and Barro, 1990) , and Japanese industrial firms (Kaplan, 1994 (Kaplan, , 1997 Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995) . Presuming that observable bank performance is a proxy for the effectiveness of managers, the likelihood of managerial turnover should be inversely related to bank performance under the hypothesis of active internal governance. Furthermore, incentives for bank executives might sharpen in the 1990s in response to changes in operating environment. Hubbard and Palia (1995) and Crawford et al. (1995) , for example, report that managerial incentives for bank executives increase following deregulatory shocks in the U.S.. Nevertheless, internal governance at Japanese banks may be ineffective for several reasons. For instance, boards of directors at banks are composed mostly of current or former employees and retired regulators, and therefore are not representatives of outside shareholders. Similarly, most banks hold annual meetings, in which executive appointments are approved, simultaneously and therefore discourage shareholder input.
In the following sections we investigate observable external and internal governance activity at Japanese banks. Again, we hypothesize that corporate control activity and meaningful managerial incentives would be consistent with active governance. Furthermore, we investigate whether governance mechanisms respond to the economic shocks experienced by Japanese banks following the onset of the banking crisis.
Ownership and control of Japanese banks
In this section we investigate external governance of Japanese banks by examining data on ownership and control. Our analysis indicates indicate that the market for corporate control among Japanese banks is relatively inactive over our entire sample period. Notably pre-crisis ownership structures of Japanese banks remain entrenched well after the onset of the banking crisis.
Data on ownership and control of Japanese banks
Our data are for banks from the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange listed in the Japan Company Handbook (JCH) from 1985 to 1996. The 110 banks listed in the JCH during this period include 13 city banks, three long-term credit banks, seven trust banks, and 87 regional banks. Following conventions in the business press, we group the city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks together as the ''top 23.'' We identify banks that cease to be listed in the JCH for reasons of failure or merger. The JCH also reports shareholdings for the top 10 owners of sample banks. Managerial shareholdings per se are not identified, and examination of the list of top 10 shareholders reveals that top executives are among sample banks' top 10 shareholders in only a small handful of instances over the sample period. The JCH also reports the total percentage of shares owned by foreign investors. The JCH volumes published in August are the first to provide financial statements for the fiscal year ending in the prior March, so data from these volumes are most likely to correspond to the end of the fiscal year.
Our 1985 to 1996 sample period coincides with the end of what Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) refer to as the deregulatory period for Japanese banks. We divide our 12-year period into a pre-crisis period of 1985 -1990 and a crisis period of 1991 -1996. Our division identifies the fiscal year beginning in April 1990 and ending in March 1991 as the first crisis year. This division of the sample period coincides with the observed downturn in real-estate prices but occurs after the initial drop in Japanese bank stock prices. Cargill, et al. (2000, pp. 42-43) refer to the 1991 -1994 period as one of ''denial and forbearance'' by Japanese bank regulators. They also suggest that 1995 and1996 were characterized by a ''minimal policy response'' that ''retains elements of the old supervision and regulation framework''.
Mergers and failures of Japanese banks over 1985 -1996
When markets for corporate control are active, economic shocks such as those experienced by Japanese banks in the late 1980s and early 1990s should prompt an increase in corporate control activity, in general, and mergers and failures, in particular (Jensen, 1993; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996) . We therefore search our sample of banks listed in the JCH for corporate control events such as mergers and bank failures, but document few in our sample period. There are three bank mergers in the 1990s: Taiyo Kobe Bank merged with Mitsui Bank in 1990; Saitama Bank merged with Kyowa Bank in 1991; and Bank of Tokyo merged with Mitsubishi Bank in 1996. Two regional banks failed at the end of our sample period: Hyogo Bank in 1995 and Taiheiyo Bank in 1996.
On one hand, the three mergers and two failures we observe over 1991 -1996 contrast with virtually no mergers or failures in the prior 6-year period. On the other hand, regulatory changes in Japan's financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s, the collapse of asset prices in the early 1990s, and the subsequent recession did not prompt widespread merger activity or failure until the late 1990s, after our sample period ends. Finally, removing incumbent bank executives does not seem to be the motive for the three mergers in our sample period; in each of the three cases the presidents of the two predecessor banks immediately became chairman and president of the merged bank. In contrast to the low level of control activity in Japan, Becher (2000) reports 511 mergers of U.S. banks between 1980 and 1996, involving transactions of more than US$151 billion in bank equity. Nearly 60% of these U.S. bank mergers, accounting for 70% of the value transacted, occurred in the 1990s. The extensive restructuring activity in the U.S. banking sector is due to material changes in operating environment caused by deregulation and other factors (Berger et al., 1999) . The absence of a similar response to the shock of the Japanese banking crisis is inconsistent with an active market for corporate control.
Ownership concentration and foreign ownership
Although we observe few mergers and failures, perhaps other changes in ownership and control occur at Japanese banks during our sample period. For example, theories of ownership structure predict that heightened uncertainty of a firm's operating environment leads to an increase in ownership concentration in order to motivate or facilitate more intense monitoring of managerial decisions (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . Table 1 This table reports the mean (median) percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder and the top 3, 5, and 10 shareholders as reported in the August volumes of the Japan Company Handbook (JCH). Also reported is the mean (median) Herfindahl ratio for share ownership, computed as the sum of the squared holdings across the top 10 shareholders. By design, the Herfindahl ratio has a maximum of 100%. Foreign ownership, reported separately by the JCH, is for all foreign shareholdings. The sample includes long-term credit banks, city banks, regional banks, mutual savings banks, and trust banks listed in the Japan Company Handbook in each sample year. a The increase in mean Herfindahl index in 1995 is due entirely to Mitsubishi Bank's share in Nippon Trust Bank, which went from 5% in 1994 to 68.8% in 1995. Excluding Nippon Trust from the sample results in a mean Herfindahl index of 0.93% for both 1995 and 1996. measures of ownership concentration for our sample banks over time. The evidence in Table 1 suggests that ownership concentration is relatively constant across time, however. For example, the top 3 shareholders control a mean (median) of 13.0% (12.4%) of outstanding shares in 1985. There is little subsequent variation in percentage owned by the top 3 shareholders, and in 1996 their mean (median) stakes total 13.0% (12.0%) of all shares. Similarly, there is little variation in ownership concentration for the top shareholder, top 3 shareholders, or top 10 shareholders. We also construct a Herfindahl concentration ratio by summing the squared ownership shares across the top 10 shareholders. The Herfindahl ratio remains largely invariant over time, with a mean increase in 1995 due to a single extreme observation, i.e., Mitsubishi Bank's move to 68.8% ownership in Nippon Trust Bank from a previous level of 5%. In short, the evidence is inconsistent with the prediction that equity ownership becomes more concentrated after the onset of the banking crisis. Table 1 also shows the level of foreign ownership in sample banks over time. Foreign ownership increases from a mean (median) of 0.4% (0.1%) in 1985 to a mean (median) of 2.7% (1.9%) in 1996. The JCH would identify foreign shareholders only if they were among the top 10 in terms of shares held. Even among the banks with the largest concentrations of foreign shareholders (e.g., Sumitomo Trust and Banking with 11.4% of shares held by foreign investors in 1996), no foreign investor is listed among the top 10 shareholders. Consequently, the increase in foreign shareholdings of Japanese banks over our sample period appears to be due to an increase in participation in the Japanese stock market by passive foreign investors with dispersed ownership, not control transactions involving foreign block holders. Table 1 indicates that ownership concentration among top shareholders of Japanese banks is nearly constant over time. Nevertheless, there may be shifts of controlling blocks among top owners. In particular, the upheaval in the Japanese banking sector in the 1990s may prompt shifts in ownership away from former controlling shareholders to new owners who could provide better monitoring or risk bearing. Bethel et al. (1998) , for example, find increased block share purchases for U.S. firms following poor performance and preceding restructuring activity. Control activity of this nature could change the identities of the top shareholders without affecting ownership concentration levels.
Changes in ownership and control among top shareholders
To measure control activity of this nature we track the shareholdings of each of the top 5 shareholders for banks listed in the 1985 Japan Company Handbook over the next 5 years ending in fiscal year 1990. In other words, we observe the extent to which the top 5 shareholders as of 1985 alter their ownership over the subsequent 5 years, both individually and as a group. Then, using the 1990 JCH's list of top 5 shareholders, we repeat the experiment over the next 5 years. We can thus compare the net transactions of the top 5 shareholders over the 5 years preceding the banking crisis to the 5 years afterwards. This procedure excludes banks that cease to be listed due to failure or merger, but includes the post-merger banks compared to the acquirer banks before the merger. The time horizon of 5 years allows us to observe shifts in equity ownership that are completed over several years. The measure is biased because reductions in equity stakes that cause a top 10 shareholder to fall off the list are treated as complete sell-offs when perhaps shareholdings remain positive yet below the threshold for the top 10. Censoring the change in stake to a sell-off sufficient to put a shareholder at parity with the smallest listed shareholder does not affect our inferences below, however. Table 2 reports changes in ownership for the top 5 shareholders over the pre-and crisis periods. Under the effective external governance hypothesis, the banking crisis in the 1990s should prompt an increase in control transactions involving these influential shareholders. In general, the opposite conclusion is drawn from Table 2 . Panel A of Table 2 reports the changes in the summed stake of the top 5 shareholders over a 5-year period. There are fewer and less dramatic changes in ownership among the top 5 shareholders over the 1990 to 1995 period compared to the preceding period. Specifically, the top 5 shareholders decreased their proportionate stake, on average, by À 2.4% over the [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] period but only by À 0.5% over the 1990 -1995 period. The standard deviation of the change in the top 5 shareholders' combined stake was 2.7% in the 5 years ending in 1990, but only 1.9% over the 1990-1995 period. Recall from Table 1 that the mean (median) ownership stake of the top 5 shareholders was 18.8% (17.7%) in 1985 and 17.6% (16.9%) in 1990, so this variation is relatively small. The distribution of these changes in the pre-crisis versus crisis years indicates that shifts in control involving the top 5 shareholders are less dispersed in the crisis period. Specifically, in the later period 67 of the 101 sample banks (66.3%) experienced a change of the combined stake of the top 5 shareholders within F 1%, compared to only 18 of the 86 sample banks (20.9%) in the earlier period. To put this another way, in the pre-crisis period of 1985 -1990, 79 .1% of sample banks had changes in ownership by the top 5 shareholders of greater than 1% in absolute terms, whereas in the crisis period of 1990 -1995 only 33.7% of sample banks had ownership changes of greater than 1% in absolute terms. Ownership by the top 5 shareholders is more entrenched after the banking crisis than before.
Changes per top 5 shareholder, reported in panel B of Table 2 , reinforce the inference of fewer control transactions after the banking crisis. The average change in ownership stake per shareholder is À 0.5% over [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] , but only À 0.1% for 1990-1995. In fact, 39.6% of the top shareholders as of 1990 display no change in their ownership stake over the following 5 years, compared to just 8.6% over the previous 5-year period. About 17.0% of controlling shareholders experience changes of greater than 1% in absolute magnitude over 1985 -1990, compared to just 9.5% of shareholders over 1990-1995. In short, ownership by controlling shareholders is more invariant after the banking crisis compared to the previous period. Observation of entrenched ownership structure following an economic shock such as the Japanese banking crisis suggests apparently inactive external governance mechanisms.
Executive turnover at Japanese banks
In this section we describe executive turnover observed at Japanese banks during our sample period of 1985 -1996. We also investigate one prediction of the hypothesis of active internal governance. Namely, we should observe an increase in managerial turnover in the 1990s if executives were punished for decisions that heightened the exposure of their banks to the banking crisis. The banking crisis did not increase the frequency of turnover for Japanese bank presidents, however.
Data on executive turnover at Japanese banks
We record the presidents and chairmen for the 110 banks listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange as reported in the JCH from 1984 to 1996. Not all sample banks are listed from the start of this sample period, but JCH coverage of all banks except one persists unless they are acquired or fail. Consequently, we focus on turnover for bank-years for which a sample bank does not fail and is not acquired.
1 Our primary emphasis is on bank presidents, consistent with earlier studies of Japanese managerial turnover (Kaplan, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995) . The JCH, for example, states, ''In general, the president of a Japanese company possesses greater decision-making powers than the chairman'' (Autumn 1998 volume, p. 67). Nevertheless, we also report data and discuss some results for turnover of bank chairmen.
In total, we track 354 distinct individuals who serve as president or chairman at sample banks over this time period. We note changes in the identities of either reported titleholder in each subsequent quarterly volume of the JCH, starting with the third quarter volume available for 1984. Fiscal years for all sample banks end in March, and the annual financial statements first appear in the subsequent August volume of the JCH. We also observe a disproportionate number of management changes in the August volumes. For example, about 60% of all presidential turnovers and 56% of all chairman turnovers are observed in the August volumes of the JCH. Clustering in executive changes could be because they tend to occur at the end of the fiscal year or because the management masthead in the JCH tends to be updated only in the August volumes. We therefore assign turnover between consecutive August volumes to the fiscal year ending in March of the latter year.
Observed frequency of executive turnover
Observed turnover is presented in Table 3 . Our procedure for observing and dating turnover results in 1198 fiscal years, 243 fiscal years with some change in titleholder, 134 annual changes in chairman, 160 changes in president, and 43 non-routine departures of president, i.e., a president does not succeed to the chairmanship. 2 The frequencies of annual turnover that correspond to these observations are: turnover of any executive, 20.3%; turnover of chairman, 11.2%; turnover of president, 13.4%; and turnover of president without succession to the chairmanship, 3.6%. About one-third of all bank years have only a president and no incumbent chairman listed in the JCH.
3 Chairman turnover for the sample of bank years with an incumbent chairman is 16.8%, or an implied tenure of 6.0 years. The 13.4% turnover rate for presidents implies an average tenure of 7.5 years.
A president assuming the chairmanship appears routine at Japanese banks, occurring 73% of the time when a president surrenders his title. Observed presidential turnover without succession occurs in 27% of all presidential turnovers, accounting for only 3.6% of our sample bank years. Turnovers of presidents without face-saving succession to the chairmanship are not only rare but also occur after a relatively short tenure. Mean (median) tenure of delisted presidents who do not succeed to the chairmanship is 4.5 (4.0) years, while mean (median) presidential tenure is 6.9 (6.0) years for expresidents that assume or retain the chairmanship. Both parametric and nonparametric tests reject that these observed tenures are equal. We therefore interpret presidential turnover without succession as non-routine and as more likely to be due to discipline of management due to poor performance. This classification is identical to that employed Kang and Shivdasani (1995) in their investigation of Japanese industrial firms. We also search for news on the non-routine turnover events in our sample. We identify eight non-routine turnovers in which the president dies or retires due to illness, resulting in an adjusted non-routine turnover rate of 2.9%. Without additional biographic information on sample executives further distinguishing turnover events as strictly attributable to bank performance is difficult, but our news search identifies 10 instances in which non-routine turnover is linked to poor bank performance in the financial press. The turnover rates in our sample are similar to those reported for U.S. banks and Japanese industrial firms. Barro and Barro (1990) , for example, report a 12.8% annual rate of CEO change for 83 U.S. banks over 1982 -1987 . Kaplan (1994 reports a 15.0% incidence of presidential turnover at 119 Japanese industrial firms over [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] 4 .7% when the president does not succeed the chairman. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) report presidential replacement at 12.9% and replacement without promotion at 4.7% for 270 non-financial Japanese firms over [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . However, non-routine turnover of president without promotion to chairman is less frequent for our sample of banks (2.9%, adjusted for death or illness) compared to the 4.7% annual rate reported for non-financial Japanese firms in both Kaplan (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) . This comparison suggests that potentially disciplinary turnover of presidents is less common at Japanese banks than at industrial firms.
Observed turnover also differs for the 23 city banks, credit banks, and trust banks versus the 87 regional banks. The top 23 banks experience turnover at the following annual rates: any turnover, 28.1%; departure of chairman, 19.5%; change of president, 19.5%; non-succession president turnover, 3.9%; and non-succession turnover excluding death or illness, 2.3%. Most large banks have an incumbent chairman (88% of bank years), and adjusting for banks that do not results in chairman turnover of 22.2% and implied tenure of 4.5 years, similar to the implied tenure of 5.1 years for presidents. Broad measures of turnover are materially lower for the 87 regional banks, i.e., 18.2% incidence of any change, 8.9% departure of chairman, and 11.7% change of president. Regional banks are less likely to have an incumbent chairman listed in the JCH (61% of fiscal years), and adjusting for this results in chairman turnover of 14.6% and implied tenure of 6.8 years. Implied tenure for regional bank presidents is 8.6 years. Chi-squared tests reject that these turnover frequencies for regional banks are identical to those for the larger banks at the 1% level. Non-succession turnover rates for bank president are not significantly different between the top 23 banks and the regional banks, however. Table 3 also compares turnover in the pre-crisis period of 1985 -1990 to the crisis period of 1991 -1996. Increased turnover rates would be consistent with ex-post settling up with bank presidents following the onset of the banking crisis. In other words, boards of directors at Japanese banks might hold bank presidents accountable for the exposure of their bank to banking crisis. Also, uncertainty induced by the crisis and the need for restructuring in its aftermath might call for replacement of incumbents with executives who possess requisite managerial skill for the new environment.
Changes in turnover following the onset of the banking crisis
The frequency of any turnover increases slightly from 19.5% to 20.9% (26.0% to 30.4% for the large banks, 17.6% to 18.6% for the small banks). This is largely due to an increase in turnover of bank chairmen from 9.9% over 1985 -1990 to 12.4% over 1991 -1996 . Adjustment for banks without incumbent chairmen only slightly diminishes this difference (15.6% for the pre-crisis period versus 17.7% for the crisis period), and chisquared tests reject that these frequencies are different at a p-value less than 1%. These adjusted rates of turnover are consistent with a decline in average chairman tenure from 6.4 to 5.6 years. This pattern holds for both the largest 23 banks and for the smaller banks, both before and after adjustment for the presence of an incumbent chairman. In contrast, presidential turnover rates do not change materially after the onset of the banking crisis (13.0% crisis compared to 13.7% pre-crisis). However, non-routine turnover of president (adjusted for deaths or illness) increases slightly for all banks from 2.6% to 3.2%, mostly due to an increase from 2.7% to 3.4% among regional banks. Notably, 8 of the 10 instances in which the financial press links non-routine turnover to performance occur after the onset of the banking crisis.
No increase in presidential turnover in the 1990s suggests an absence of ex-post settling up for the decisions made by incumbent presidents that increased bank risk prior to the banking crisis. 4 It also indicates an absence of widespread replacement of incumbents by executives with skills better suited to the crisis environment. Absolute bank performance deteriorated dramatically following the banking crisis, so a lack of a dramatic increase in presidential turnover also implies the absence of a relation with absolute bank performance. There is a slight acceleration in the departure of incumbent chairmen, however. This phenomenon could suggest that some chairmen, rather than presidents, are responsible for devising and implementing bank policies, and hence are held accountable for exposure to the banking crisis and poor bank performance. On the other hand, perhaps bank chairmen resign as a symbolic gesture in the face of organizational inadequacies for which they are not largely responsible. Our investigation of the relation between turnover and bank performance addresses these questions.
Bank performance and executive turnover
We next investigate the relation between managerial turnover and bank performance measured by stock prices and accounting profitability. We do not detect a relation between non-routine turnover and bank performance before the banking crisis, but managerial incentives sharpen measurably in the 1990s.
Measures of bank performance
We rely on the University of Rhode Island's Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP) Database to compute performance measures for Japanese banks. After accounting for unavailable data for some banks, the sample comprises 101 banks and 1133 bank years. 5 4 One interpretation is that the decisions of Japanese bank executives were ex-post disastrous only due to bad luck, but banks differed in their decisions to expose themselves to risks inherent in lending to volatile sectors such as real estate and construction (Dinc ß, 1999; Van Rixtel and Hassink, 1998) .
5 Data are not available from PACAP for nine regional banks that account for 65 bank years out of the JCH sample of 1198. The missing data are distributed evenly over the sample period and the JCH provides data until the fourth quarter of 1996 for all but three of these nine banks. Consequently, survivorship bias does not explain why data for most of these banks do not appear in the PACAP database. Additional bank years are lost due to data inadequacies with regard to particular performance measures we discuss below.
We calculate three performance measures based on stock prices: the raw stock return for each fiscal year; market-adjusted return calculated as raw return minus the return on the PACAP equally weighted market index; and an industry-adjusted return calculated as the raw return minus the return on the PACAP index for bank stocks. 6 We calculate three performance measures based on accounting income: return on assets (ROA) calculated as net income divided by year-end assets; change in ROA calculated as ROA minus the previous year's ROA; and industry-adjusted ROA calculated as ROA minus the median ROA for the fiscal year.
7 Consistent with other studies, we employ indicator variables for low or negative profitability in addition to continuous measures. Finally, we also measure bank performance based on asset growth and industry-adjusted asset growth. Table 4 provides summary statistics on bank performance. Performance measures in the crisis period of 1991 -1996 versus the pre-crisis period of 1985-1990 reflect dramatic change in the operating environment of Japanese banks. Specifically, mean (median) raw stock return is 29.43% (21.60%) before the crisis, but À 7.55% ( À 7.59%) after the crisis. Mean (median) return on assets is 0.2445% (0.2364%) before the crisis, but only 0.0636% (0.1424%) after the crisis. Finally, bank assets grow at a mean (median) annual rate of 11.88% (11.10%) before the crisis, compared to 1.14% (1.21%) afterwards.
We presume that boards of directors rely on publicly observable measures of performance such as stock prices or accounting profitability when they evaluate bank executives. Prior studies suggest that managerial turnover at banks, in general, is more likely to be related to stock returns than accounting performance. Barro and Barro (1990) , for example, suggest that incentives for bank managers should be based on stock prices because banks enjoy greater accounting discretion than other firms. For Japanese banks, in particular, Genay (1998) finds that Japanese banks smooth accounting income, that the strength of the relation between accounting performance and stock returns varies over time, and that ''Japanese accounting, disclosure, and regulatory practices might have driven a wedge between banks' accounting and stock returns in recent years'' (p. 13). Several studies suggest, nevertheless, that stock prices reflect differential bank risk and operating performance in spite of opaque financial reporting and lax regulatory policies in Japan (Brewer et al., 1999; Yamori, 1999; Bremer and Pettway, 2002) . Nevertheless, there will be a bias against an empirical relation between observable performance and executive turnover if boards of directors also rely on private information to assess managerial effectiveness.
The relation between performance and executive turnover
To assess the empirical relation between bank performance and managerial turnover we estimate separate logit models of the following parsimonious form for Handbook during 1985 Handbook during to 1996 . Stock return in computed without dividends for the fiscal year. Market-adjusted stock return is fiscal year stock return net the equally weight PACAP market index. Industry-adjusted stock return is fiscal year stock return net the return on PACAP index of bank stocks. Return on assets is computed as net income over end-of-year assets. Change in ROA is current year ROA net previous year ROA. Industry-adjusted ROA is ROA net the median ROA for sample banks in the same fiscal year. Asset growth is year-end asset growth from previous year assets. Industry-adjusted asset growth subtracts the median asset growth for sample banks for each fiscal year. samples from the pre-crisis sample period of [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] and the crisis period of 1991 -1996:
where q is the probability of non-routine presidential turnover (adjusted for death or illness), PERFORMANCE is measured using either stock returns or accounting profitability, and PREVIOUS TURNOVER is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the incumbent president for a sample bank has less than 2 years of tenure at the start of the fiscal year, indicating that it is unlikely that turnover will occur (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995) . Under the hypothesis of active internal governance we predict an inverse relation between measures of bank performance and non-routine presidential turnover. We use estimated coefficients from Eq. (1) and calculate an implied probability of turnover as follows for a given level of performance under the assumption of no prior turnover:
We are particularly interested in how the relation between performance and nonroutine turnover differs in the pre-crisis period versus the crisis period. With regard to the sample of bank years from 1985 to 1990, estimates of Eq. (1) will inform us whether Japanese bank presidents faced performance incentives in the years preceding the onset of banking crisis. With regard to the crisis period, we hypothesize that bank performance more strongly affects managerial turnover than in the earlier period since the shocks of the 1990s heighten the importance of managerial decisions to bank profitability and survival. Such a result would be consistent with findings of Crawford et al. (1995) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) who show that managerial incentives become stronger when U.S. banks experience deregulation and increased competition. Kole and Lehn (1999) report similar results for the U.S. airline industry when deregulation heightened the contribution of managerial decision-making to firm profitability and survival. Other studies that examine the performance -turnover relation around a common event include Mikkelson and Partch's (1997) investigation of U.S. firms before and after a decline in aggregate takeover activity and Dahya et al. (2002) investigation of U.K. firms before and after the promulgation of a code of best practice regarding boards of directors.
5.3. Non-routine executive turnover and stock-price performance Table 5 reports estimates of logit equations of the likelihood of non-routine presidential turnover (adjusted for death or illness) conditioned on stock returns in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. Panel A of Table 5 reports results for the sample of 501 bank years from 1985 to 1990 for which return data are available from PACAP. The coefficient estimates for all three return measures are positive but statistically indistinguishable from zero. The coefficient estimate for previous turnover is negative as predicted for each specification but not statistically different from zero. Omission of the previous turnover indicator variable does not result in different inferences for the stock return performance measures from those reported in Table 5 . The chi-squared statistics derived from the likelihood functions for each equation indicate that the estimated equations do not explain the likelihood of non-routine turnover over this sample period. In general, Panel A of Table 5 indicates an absence of a relation between bank stock returns and non-routine turnover prior to the onset of the banking crisis.
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The results for the 584 bank years from 1991 to 1996 are reported in Panel B of Table 5 . An inverse and statistically significant relation exists between stock returns and non-routine turnover in the crisis period. The coefficient estimate for raw stock return is À 2.3043 ( p-value of 11.54%), but the coefficient estimates for both marketadjusted return and industry-adjusted return are more negative and statistically different from zero (coefficients of À 4.8972, p-value of 0.22%, and À 5.0300, p-value of 0.20%, respectively). The coefficients for the indicator variable for previous turnover are negative and significant in all three specifications, indicating that tenure affects turnover likelihood in the 1990s. Specifically, the unconditional probabilities of nonroutine turnover for recently hired presidents (implied by the coefficient estimates in This table provides coefficients on logit regressions of non-routine presidential turnover, defined as change of president not due to death or illness and the ex-president does not become chairman. The sample consists of fiscal years for First Section TSE-listed banks with data available from the Japan Company Handbook during 1985 to 1996. Stock return is computed without dividends for the fiscal year. Market-adjusted stock return is raw return net the equally weighted PACAP market index. Industry-adjusted stock return is fiscal year stock return net the return on the PACAP index of bank stocks. Previous turnover is equal to one if the observed tenure of the incumbent president is less than 2 years at the start of the fiscal year. Figures in parentheses below coefficient estimates are p-values associated with asymptotic t-tests. Table 5 ) are less than 1% in the crisis period but about 3% in the pre-crisis period. Incidentally, when this indicator variable is omitted, the coefficient estimates on the latter two performance measures change only slightly from those reported in Table 5 and remain different from zero at 1% significance levels. Finally, when we pool the pre-crisis and crisis samples we find that the coefficients on stock price performance are significantly more negative in the crisis period. We omit reporting these specifications for brevity. Table 6 reports turnover probabilities implied by the logit equation estimates from Table 5 as well as observed turnover frequency across stock return quintiles. Observed frequency is reported for sample banks with an incumbent president with fewer than 2 years of tenure at the start of the fiscal year. Predicted turnover is calculated using the coefficient estimates from Table 5 with the performance measure set at each quintile's respective median and the indicator variable for previous turnover set to zero. Panel A reports this comparison for the pre-crisis bank years of [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] . Consistent with our inferences from Table 5 , the implied probabilities and observed frequencies of non-routine turnover do not suggest that non-routine turnover decreases as stock performance improves.
Panel B of Table 6 reports the observed and predicted frequency of non-routine turnover for the crisis period. Predicted turnover frequencies across performance quintiles reflect economically significant dispersion. Specifically, for predicted frequency of nonroutine turnover for the worst versus best quintiles are 6.8% versus 2.7% in the case of raw return, 8.1% versus 1.4% in the case of market-adjusted return, and 8.2% versus 1.4% in the case of industry-adjusted return. Observed frequencies of turnover are not monotonically decreasing across performance quintiles. Nevertheless, for market-adjusted return and industry-adjusted return the worst quintiles display the highest rates of turnover frequency (7.0% and 7.4%, respectively) and the best quintiles display the lowest rates (1.6% and 0.0%, respectively).
The results reported in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that stock-price performance does not affect the likelihood of non-routine turnover before the onset of the banking crisis. After the onset of the crisis, however, there is a significant inverse relation between stock returns and turnover. In fact, the relation is comparable in magnitude to results obtained employing similar methodologies for samples of Japanese industrial firms. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) , for example, report that the probability of non-routine turnover for Japanese firms in the bottom decile of excess stock return is 6.4% versus 2.5% for firms in the top decile (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995, Table 4, p. 43) . Kaplan (1994) , Kang and Shivdasani (1995) , and Kaplan and Ramseyer (1996) interpret relations of this magnitude as evidence of effective internal governance for Japanese industrial firms. Jensen and Murphy (1990) , in contrast, question whether performance related dismissal probabilities of these magnitudes provide economically significant incentives for managers. They view the expected loss of managerial wealth due to performance-related dismissal as small relative to the losses of shareholders. Viewed from this perspective, the incentives we document for Japanese bank executives in the 1990s could be regarded as small. Regardless of the perspective, however, our results clearly indicate that stock-price incentives for Japanese bank presidents sharpened measurably after the onset of the banking crisis. This table reports predicted and observed incidence of non-routine presidential turnover at Japanese banks based on stock price performance. Non-routine turnover is defined as change of president not due to death or illness and the ex-president does not become chairman. The pre-and crisis samples of bank years are categorized by raw stock return, market-adjusted return, or industry-adjusted return. Predicted turnover is calculated as e
, where a and b are the coefficient estimates reported in Table 5 , RETURN is the quintile median return, and the indicator variable for previous turnover is set to zero. Observed turnover is number of turnover observations divided by bank years with an incumbent president with more than 2 years of tenure at the start of the fiscal year. 5.4. Non-routine executive turnover and profitability Table 7 reports estimates of logit equations of non-routine turnover conditioned on accounting-based measures of profitability. Panel A reports results for the sample of 534 bank years from 1985 to 1990 for which financial statement data are available from PACAP. The coefficient estimates for return on assets (ROA), change in ROA, and industry-adjusted ROA are not statistically distinguishable from zero. The fourth column uses an indicator variable equal to 1 if industry-adjusted return on assets is in the lowest quintile and otherwise 0. For this specification, the coefficient is positive (1.0256, p-value of 5.71%), indicating that the poorest performing bank years had significantly higher likelihood of turnover. The implied probability of turnover for banks in the worst quintile in terms of industry-adjusted ROA is 5.7% versus 2.1% for other banks. When indicator variables for low ROA or low change in ROA are included the coefficient estimates are positive but not significant at conventional levels. For brevity, we omit results for these variables from Table 7 . There are no bank years with negative income in the pre-crisis period, so we cannot employ an indicator variable for negative income. Finally, coefficients on the previous turnover variable remain insignificant for the pre-crisis period across all specifications.
In contrast to the pre-crisis years, results in Panel B for the 596 bank years from the crisis years of 1991-1996 consistently indicate a negative and statistically significant relation between profitability and non-routine turnover. In particular, the coefficient estimates on return on assets, change in ROA, and industry-adjusted ROA are negative and statistically significant (coefficients and p-values of À 0.4735 (1.96%), À 0.4374 (3.53%), and À 0.4703 (2.07%), respectively). An indicator variable for worst quintile industry-adjusted ROA is positive and statistically significant (coefficient of 1.4410, pvalue of 0.37%). The implied probability of turnover for banks in the worst quintile in terms of industry-adjusted ROA is 11.8% versus 3.1% for other banks. 9 This result is similar to that reported by Kaplan (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) for Japanese industrial firms. Specifically, these studies use an indicator variable for negative income and find that it is strongly related to managerial turnover. For our sample, no bank reports negative income in the pre-crisis period of 1985 -1990 , and observations of negative income are clustered near the end of our sample period. Nevertheless, for the crisis period we find that a negative income indicator variable is also a good predictor of non-routine managerial turnover (coefficient estimate of 2.2834, p-value less than 0.0001). Finally, coefficients on the indicator variable for previous turnover are significantly negative across all crisis-period specifications, implying a reduction in non-routine turnover for recently hired presidents. Table 8 reports turnover probabilities implied by our logit equation estimates in Table 7 as well as the observed frequency of non-routine turnover across profitability quintiles. Observed frequency is reported for sample banks with an incumbent president with fewer than 2 years of tenure at the start of the fiscal year. Predicted turnover is calculated using the coefficient estimates from Table 7 with the continuous performance measures set at This table provides coefficients on logit regressions of non-routine presidential turnover, defined as change of president not due to death or illness and the ex-president does not become chairman. The sample consists of fiscal years for First Section TSE-listed banks with data available from the Japan Company Handbook during 1985 to 1996. Return on assets is computed as net income over end-of-year assets. Change in ROA is current year ROA net previous year ROA. Industry-adjusted ROA is ROA net the median ROA for sample banks in the same fiscal year. LOWROA is equal to 1 if industry-adjusted ROA is in the bottom quintile and otherwise 0. NEGINC is equal to one if net income is negative (there are no negative income bank years in the pre-crisis sample period). Previous turnover is equal to 1 if the observed tenure of the incumbent president is less than 2 years at the start of the fiscal year. This table reports predicted and observed incidence of non-routine presidential turnover at Japanese banks based on profitability. Non-routine turnover is defined as change of president not due to death or illness and the ex-president does not become chairman. The pre-and crisis samples of bank years are categorized by return on assets (ROA), change in ROA, and industry-adjusted ROA. Predicted turnover is calculated as e
, where a and b are the coefficient estimates reported in Table 7 , PROFIT is the quintile median profitability measure, and the indicator variable for previous turnover is set to zero. Observed turnover is number of turnover observations divided by bank years with an incumbent president with more than 2 years of tenure at the start of the fiscal year.
C Table 7 regarding banks in the worst quintile of performance with respect to industry-adjusted ROA is not very robust. Specifically, while the turnover in the worst quintile is higher than the others combined, a large part of the difference is because there are no turnover observations in the second-worst performance quintile. Based on a simple below median versus above median cut of the data, there is no perceptible indication that more profitable firms have lower levels of turnover, and in fact for all three pre-crisis profitability measures the highest rates of turnover are observed in the best performing quintiles. Panel B of Table 8 reports the observed and predicted frequency of non-routine turnover by accounting income quintile for the crisis period. The predicted levels of turnover decline as performance improves, but the dispersion across performance quintiles is low, ranging from a maximum of 4.5% in the worst quintiles to a minimum of 4.1% in the best quintiles. Furthermore, examination of the observed frequencies indicates that a logit specification with continuous accounting performance variables does not fit the data well. In particular, there is an unusually high rate of observed turnover in the worst performing quintiles (12.3% for ROA, 11.3% for change in ROA, 15.1% for industryadjusted ROA), but little evidence of a relation across the remaining performance quintiles. Furthermore, the implied probability of non-routine turnover for negative income bank-years is 24.7% versus 3.2% for other bank years. In other words, over 1991-1996 non-routine presidential turnover occurs disproportionately among banks that perform very poorly and at a materially lower but more or less uniform rate among other banks. Prior studies characterize differences in conditional turnover rates of this magnitude as economically significant and evidence of effective internal governance.
Additional results
Finally, in addition to the results reported in the previous tables, we also consider measures of bank performance based on asset growth as well as alternative categories of executive turnover, including routine turnover of presidents and turnover of chairmen. In general, the null hypotheses associated with the additional tests we conduct are not rejected, and consequently we do not report these results.
First, bank managers may have incentives to increase or maintain bank size. A feature of the pre-crisis environment is rapid growth of banks. Recall that Table 4 reports that the mean (median) annual rate of growth over the 1985-1990 period was 11.88% (11.10%). In the crisis environment, mean (median) annual asset growth slows to 1.14% (1.21%), indicating preservation of bank size, on average, in spite of the change in operating environment. We investigate whether growth in assets or industry-adjusted growth in assets condition non-routine turnover of Japanese bank presidents. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a relation between growth in assets and turnover for either the pre-crisis period or crisis period. In short, Japanese bank managers are not punished for slow growth in the 1980s, but on the other hand, neither are they punished for failure to downsize in the 1990s.
Second, we investigate whether routine presidential turnover, i.e., when an incumbent president ceases to be president but then obtains or retains the title of chairman, is related to performance. Allowing a president of a poorly performing bank to acquire the title of chairman, even if just for a year or two, may permit him to save face and preserve social prestige. Consequently, perhaps some routine turnovers are related to performance. The annual rate for routine turnover is about 9.7% in the pre-crisis period and 9.8% in the crisis period. We investigate whether bank performance measures condition routine turnover in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods subject to alternative ways of controlling for the different frequency between top 23 banks and regional banks. In general, we find that bank performance measured alternatively by stock prices, accounting income, or asset growth does not influence the frequency of routine turnover in either period for either large or small banks.
Finally, Table 3 reports an increase in the rate of turnover of chairmen over the 1991 -1996 compared to the pre-crisis period. Examining only those observations for which there is a listed chairman at the start of the fiscal year, chairman turnover rates increase from 16.8% to 17.7%. In Section 4, we conjecture that this increase in turnover could be related to declining bank performance in the crisis period. To formally investigate this notion, we identify bank years for which there is an incumbent chairman and note his tenure in that office. We then investigate the relation between bank performance and chairman turnover for this sample of firms. In all specifications, we fail to find a statistically significant relation between chairman turnover and stock price performance, profitability, or asset growth in either the pre-crisis period or crisis period. Various methods for addressing the effect of chairman tenure and the different rates of turnover at large banks versus regional banks do not alter the inference that turnover of bank chairmen is unrelated to recent bank performance.
Conclusion
The banking sector plays a prominent role in the Japanese economy and experienced myriad changes during the past two decades. Such changes include deregulation, increasing exposure to globalization, the collapse of asset prices in the early 1990s, the banking crisis that followed, and the decay of the bank-centered keiretsu system of corporate governance (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001) . In light of the importance of the banking system in the Japanese economy, the scarcity of empirical evidence on corporate governance of Japanese banks is conspicuous. In particular, there is little evidence on how corporate governance activity at Japanese banks conditioned or responded to these events.
We investigate governance activity at over 100 TSE-listed Japanese banks for a 12-year period centered on the onset of the banking crisis in the early 1990s. External governance mechanisms appear relatively inactive throughout our sample period. Specifically, ownership concentration is largely invariant, top shareholders appear entrenched, and there are few mergers or failures in spite of the economic shocks associated with the banking crisis.
Absent external governance via an active market for corporate control and a policy of forbearance by Japanese bank regulators, internal mechanisms must provide strong incentives for managers. In particular, removal of poorly performing managers is a critical task for internal governance mechanisms.
Consequently, we investigate top executive turnover at Japanese banks and how it is affected by bank performance. We do not find a relation between bank performance and non-routine turnover of bank presidents in the pre-crisis period of 1985 -1990 , suggesting that Japanese bank executives were insulated from disciplinary dismissal because of poor relative performance prior to the banking crisis. In contrast, we find a significantly negative relation between non-routine presidential turnover and bank performance measures such as stock returns or profitability in the crisis years of 1991 -1996. Additionally, the performance -turnover sensitivities we document at Japanese banks in the 1990s are comparable to those reported for Japanese industrial firms by Kaplan (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) , and corporate governance of Japanese industrial firms has been judged to be active on the basis of such results (Kaplan and Ramseyer, 1996) .
Our results complement other recent investigations that examine corporate governance of Japanese banks. Dinc ß (1999) finds that risky lending is associated with business ties between Japanese banks and their major shareholders in the 1980s, suggesting that bank clients are poor monitors or impede monitoring by other shareholders. Similarly, Van Rixtel and Hassink (1998) find that Japanese banks with retired regulatory personnel as directors are more likely to shift lending to riskier borrowers in the real estate, construction, and financial sectors during the 1989-1993 period. Our finding of a lack of a performance -turnover relation in the late 1980s is consistent with these studies in suggesting that aspects of corporate governance exacerbated the Japanese banking crisis. Additionally, even though we find a sharpening of performance-related incentives in the 1990s, it is arguable whether incentives of this economic magnitude are powerful enough to substitute for an active market for corporate control. In particular, internal incentives may not be powerful enough to motivate restructuring following external shocks that require downsizing and consolidation (Jensen, 1993; Kaplan, 1997; Mikkelson and Partch, 1997) . Thus, the delay in restructuring of the Japanese banking sector, which began in the late 1990s, could in part be due to an inadequate response by corporate governance mechanisms.
Our findings also complement studies on the banking relationships and governance in Japan. Studies based on data from the 1980s emphasize the benefits of bank monitoring, but recent studies find that banking relationships deteriorated or were not to the benefit of the client firms in the 1990s (Morck and Nakamura, 1999; Gibson, 1995; Kang and Stulz, 2000) . Our results suggest that in the 1990s bank executives faced incentives more directly tied to bank performance. How changes in governance at Japanese banks, in general, and the performance objectives of bank executives, in particular, affect bank -client relationships is an interesting avenue for future research.
Finally, the Japanese financial system has continued to undergo change since the end of our sample period in 1996. In particular, the frequency of merger and failure increased and the banking sector has undergone some contraction, albeit delayed. In short, external governance mechanisms appear more active than in earlier periods, complementing our empirical results that suggest that bank executives also now face sharper performancebased incentives. The implications of more active corporate governance of Japanese banks at the dawn of the 21st century should prove to be an intriguing topic for future research.
